{"id":6279,"date":"2026-06-13T03:48:23","date_gmt":"2026-06-13T10:48:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/?p=6279"},"modified":"2026-06-15T06:43:43","modified_gmt":"2026-06-15T13:43:43","slug":"ukraines-shotgun-doctrine-a-blueprint-for-the-fpv-battlefield","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/tw\/product-development\/ukraines-shotgun-doctrine-a-blueprint-for-the-fpv-battlefield\/","title":{"rendered":"\u70cf\u514b\u862d\u7684\u300c\u9730\u5f48\u69cd\u6230\u7565\u300d\uff1aFPV \u6230\u5834\u7684\u85cd\u5716"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Ukraine\u2019s Approach to Drone Defense<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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The philosophy of Ukraine\u2019s shotgun deployment as a counter method against FPV drones. An analysis of what works, what does not, and future tactical considerations.
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June 2, 2026
<\/i>By Vance Fulton

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Evolving Threat Environment<\/h2>\n

Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered an unparalleled shift in combat trends and operations driven by the widespread use of FPV drones. The rate of combat development seen in Ukraine provides strong evidence that present and future conflicts will not be decided by traditional long-range precision methods. Drone attacks, which can be executed at speeds of up to 90 mph, while also having the ability to rapidly close engagement distances, indicate that traditional infantry doctrine is being forced to adapt.<\/p>\n

The following guide, created by Russian military channels, is included not as an endorsement but as independent evidence that drone threats have forced new defensive adaptations on both sides.<\/em><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"Translated\n
Translated Russian soldier field guide distinguishing enemy drones by size, speed, and altitude. The tactical premise “Shoot first, then run away” demonstrates a unique characteristic of drone defense. Source: @GrandpaRoy2 via X.<\/em><\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n

Unwave, a Ukrainian company specializing in electronic warfare and drone threat mitigation, offers equipment such as the BMX250-5 MS<\/a><\/span> drone jammer as an effective countermeasure. However, interference equipment similar to the devices that Unwave offers is often a premium while carrying certain limitations at the individual level. Devices like the 35-mm Oerlikon autocannons<\/a><\/span>, which are typically used to take out unmanned suicide Shahed drones, are physically and economically ill-suited to apply to low-cost FPV drones.<\/p>\n

By extension of Ukraine and its drone-concentrated battlefield, an unorthodox solution has emerged: the shotgun. The shotgun previously thought to be exclusively instrumental in breaching and close-quarter engagements has inadvertently become an answer as a practical, accessible, low-cost, and lethal defense tool against FPV drones.<\/p>\n

Ukraine’s front-line shotgun doctrine suggests that shotguns are not intended to phase out long-range precision methods such as traditional rifles or other practices of combat, but rather, the frontlines suggest that shotguns are now an indispensable portion of defense for FPV drone-contested combat zones. Elements of barrel length, choke modification, ammunition, and training principles ought to be analyzed when it comes to analyzing specific platform selections in the context of shotgun integration.<\/p>\n

Case for the Shotgun<\/h2>\n

The shotgun thesis is not theoretical; rather, it is practical. Ivan Iliukhin, a former Ukrainian soldier and owner of firearm training organization, GunBro Ukraine<\/a>,<\/span> provides input on the shotgun thesis in an interview<\/a><\/span> with Volya Radio conducted on November 2, 2025.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"Shotgun\n
Shotgun demonstration session by instructor Ivan Iliukhin. Source: GunBro Ukraine<\/em><\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n

The interview is translated by Ivan’s daughter, Oleksandra Iliukhina, who partners with her father in conducting civilian and soldier training operations. Oleksandra is also the 2025 European Shotgun Champion and a member of Benelli Armi.<\/p>\n

Ivan, in defense of the shotgun, states in the interview, “People used to laugh at shotguns, especially on the battlefield, since everyone was used to rifles. But now we see the need for shotguns and how they are being used on the battlefield\u2026a shield against Russian drones, but also shotguns can be used in trenches and close-range fighting, which makes the shotgun balanced.”<\/p>\n

Ivan explains that initially, engagement distances were up to 200 meters when the war first began. This engagement distance inherently made rifles the default weapon of choice. However, as the war progressed, drone development followed suit. Drones originally used for aerial photography became surveillance tools. Heavy agricultural drones originally used for spraying crops, fertilizer, and pesticides were repurposed for mortar drops. These developments resulted in decreased engagement distances, around 20-30 meters. Due to this reality, the shotgun became the obvious middle-ground platform.<\/p>\n

Despite being a heavy advocate of the shotgun, Ivan still acknowledges that it is possible to bring down a drone with a rifle. However, doing so requires a complex understanding of ballistics, familiarity with the rifle, and an excellent sense of preemption, all while under combat stress. Soldiers under combat stress typically experience impairments in vision, motor control, and cognition<\/a><\/span>, all of which hinder combat performance and accuracy in hitting targets. Shotguns attempt to change this dynamic and level the playing field entirely.<\/p>\n

As Ivan explains, shotguns do not require the same precision as rifles. Instead, a shotgun demands proximity, which allows operators to be slightly more inaccurate. The rationale behind the proximity argument is that when a shotgun is discharged, pellets are released in a scattered, but moderately organized, spreading pattern.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"A\n
A Ukrainian soldier firing a semi-automatic shotgun downrange during a training exercise. Source: GunBro Ukraine<\/em><\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n

A shotgun’s spread pattern has the ability to make contact and drone kill probability increasingly more likely when compared to singular linear rounds. This concept will be discussed further in the tactical consideration sections.<\/p>\n

An additional contention for the case of the shotgun as an effective counter considers economic and practical components. As previously stated, electronic jammers and anti-drone weapon systems are the ideal answer to FPV drones and aerial targets alike since they require little to no direct contact with the drones themselves.<\/p>\n

However, weapon systems cannot be deployed everywhere, and FPV drones that use radio signals continue to be innovated and refined to resist interference systems<\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n

Further, weapon systems and interference technology typically remain more costly than shotgun usage. The BTS-12<\/a><\/span>, for example, is a semi-automatic gas-operated bullpup shotgun utilized by Ukrainian forces<\/a>,<\/span> typically costing around $400-500. Some shotguns being employed cost even less, since assortments of shotguns that are being used by a handful of Ukrainian forces come from volunteers and recreational shooters alike.<\/p>\n

Platform Selection: Performance Factors<\/h2>\n

In the first interview conducted on Volya Radio with Ivan, questions of performance were discussed in the context of various shotgun models. Two types of shotguns were mentioned: pump-action shotguns and semi-automatic shotguns.<\/p>\n

Ivan explains that the most suitable shotguns for drone engagements are semi-automatic shotguns. One specific model mentioned was the Benelli M4<\/a><\/span>, a semi-automatic shotgun with a barrel length of 47-51 cm. High-quality Turkish clones were also endorsed for addressing various needs on the frontline.<\/p>\n

These models are endorsed for a number of reasons. For one, semi-automatic shotguns like the Benelli M4 and its Turkish replicas have a barrel that is compatible with various types of chokes, as well as a telescopic stock. However, the more pertinent reason for selecting a semi-automatic platform is that semi-automatic platforms require less training than pump-action platforms.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"Instructor\n
Instructor Ivan Iliukhin providing instruction to Ukrainian soldiers at GunBro Ukraine’s training range. Source: GunBro Ukraine<\/em><\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n

An operator’s effectiveness in using a pump action at the highest level depends on extensive training and a high level of shooting skill, both of which take an immense amount of time to develop. With the shotgun doctrine being a relatively new countermeasure against FPV drones, Ukrainian soldiers need to develop the basics with an entry-level friendly shotgun.<\/p>\n

Semi-automatic shotguns such as the Benelli M4 and its Turkish replicas allow for faster operator proficiency, requiring less time to reach a functional combat benchmark. This platform selection emphasizes the idea of accessibility being a tactical necessity for FPV drone defense.<\/p>\n

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\"A\n
A four-tier comparison chart of shotgun platforms used by Ukrainian forces, comparing acquisition methods, reliability, and anti-drone capability. Source: Data compiled from interviews and manufacturer specifications.<\/em><\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n

Accessibility, however, is only one dimension of platform selection; reliability is the other. Lux, a Ukrainian soldier and drone pilot, shared his view in correspondence with international soldiers and volunteers facilitating shotgun donations to Ukrainian forces. Lux stresses that donated platforms must be high quality, warning that “cheap semi-automatic Turkish shotguns should not be distributed to soldiers.” Their reliability, he explains, is conditional: “You have to keep it really lubricated and out of the dirt. Some guys put duct tape over the ejection port.”<\/p>\n

Lux’s distinction is important: a platform must be easy to learn but also dependable. Low price and trainability mean very little if the weapon fails when needed the most.<\/p>\n

Tactical Considerations: Barrel Length Analysis<\/h2>\n

There are three variables that should be considered when evaluating the tactical elements of shotgun use in Ukraine: barrel length, choke selection, and ammunition. Short barrel length has remained the creed for most shotgun usage in CQB (close quarter combat). Shorter barrel lengths offer greater maneuverability and speed, making it easier to engage with threats in tight, enclosed spaces.<\/p>\n

Most soldiers adopt CQB instincts when handling shotguns; however, combat in Ukraine challenges this idea. Shorter barrels are superior in the context of breaching operations, but anti-drone events are an entirely different problem. Drones are not in corridors; they approach targets at high speeds and from a distance, meaning that every meter of range matters when a soldier prepares to engage. Each centimeter of barrel length increases the range of engagement, a critical aspect in drone encounters.<\/p>\n

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\"UA-DH<\/figure>\n
\"UA-DH<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n

Both UA-DH 25 models and their engagement distances by barrel length configuration. Source: Urban Arms<\/p>\n

The long-range UA-DH possesses a barrel length of 24 inches or 61 centimeters. This model offers an engagement distance between 50 and 60 meters. Compare this to the short-range labeled UA-DH, which possesses a barrel length of 18.5 inches or 47 centimeters. This specific model offers an engagement distance of 40-50 meters.<\/p>\n

Both models would be an appropriate weapon of choice for taking out FPV drones. Ivan explains that the most effective distance to take out drones is around 40-45 meters; beyond that, it becomes much harder to hit the drone. Any closer, the risk of collateral damage grows. Both UA-DH models in the graphics above demonstrate an engagement capability between 40-45 meters, making both weapons ideal.<\/p>\n

Choke Selection Analysis<\/h2>\n

Ivan argues that choke selection is one of the most critical components in shotgun applications against drones. A choke<\/a> <\/span>controls the grouping of a shot, or how a shot spreads out when a weapon is fired. Different chokes allow pellets to spread out differently; e.g., a cylinder choke offers insufficient range needed to engage drones, since the pellet spread disperses faster as it travels toward a target. Compare this to modified chokes, which cause the pellets to disperse at a more gradual pace, leading to increased range.<\/p>\n

The comparison between each choke is meant to indicate that choke variations depend entirely on the operation and desired outcomes. Without the proper choke, it is harder to engage with a drone from a longer distance, a crucial variable in countermeasure tactics. This is why Ivan endorses a modified choke in cases of anti-drone operations and defense. A modified choke offers an increased engagement distance, while also being able to deliver enough mass due to improved pellet grouping.<\/p>\n

Assuming contact is made with a drone once a shot is fired, the drone is either redirected due to the density of the impact, or the drone itself is destroyed entirely. A modified choke does not mean that the spread of the shot is nonexistent; rather, it offers a simultaneous compromise in terms of precision, range, and spread. That being said, choke adjustments should be configured to a mission’s platform and resist a one-size-fits-all approach, similar to the philosophy of barrel length.<\/p>\n

Ammunition Analysis<\/h2>\n

Ammunition selection when it comes to defending against aerial targets follows a different rationale when compared to infantry applications. The goal of neutralizing a drone comes not exclusively from the projectile’s energy, but rather the projectile’s probability of impact. Simply put, enough pellets need to make contact with a drone to destroy or deflect it.<\/p>\n

To increase the chance of contact occurring, a spread pattern must be wide enough to compensate for margins of operator error. A highly kinetic projectile that misses a target is practically useless. One hundred pellets that are dense enough to saturate a drone and its rotors, however, are a probability multiplier. This means that the pull of a shotgun trigger with the goal of taking out a drone is dominated by probability rather than precision.<\/p>\n

#3 birdshot and #4 buckshot were two types of shotgun ammunition mentioned by Ivan. The distinction between buckshot and birdshot ammunition plays a crucial role in FPV drone defense. The distinguishing feature of buckshot when compared to birdshot is that buckshot ammunition carries fewer pellets due to its larger size<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Since the pellet sizes are larger, fewer pellets fit in the shotshell hull. Conversely, birdshot ammunition holds more pellets due to each individual pellet being smaller, naturally allowing more pellets to fit inside the shotshell hull. Since buckshot ammunition offers less pellet capacity but larger shots, it requires correct lead and timing, trading pellet count for individual pellet mass and energy. Birdshot ammunition, on the other hand, operates under a different ballistic logic entirely. Birdshot ammunition offers dramatically higher pellet counts, with #3 birdshot loads offering pellets of around 100+<\/a><\/span> per shell, sacrificing raw pellet energy in favor of shot density and pellet dispersion.<\/p>\n

At a typical engagement distance of 20-30 meters, #3 birdshot ammunition covers the approximate FPV flight frame to maximize pellet contact probability. Load selection, however, should align with target types. For standard lightweight FPV drones most commonly encountered in Ukraine battle spaces, #3 birdshot and similar ammunition alike should remain endorsed. For larger, more robust drone targets like repurposed agricultural drones, buckshot ammunition becomes relevant despite a lower pellet count.<\/p>\n

Ivan mentions that an effective way to use a shotgun is with different alternating sequences of buckshot and birdshot shells within the magazine, a tactic that Ivan used himself during his time on the frontline. He notes, however, that this tactic should be reserved strictly for well-trained shooters. Using alternating ammunition requires an immense amount of cognitive combat ability. An operator must know which shell is chambered and the subsequent shell that will enter the chamber after each shot.<\/p>\n

Ukrainian units operating in relevant environments where both threat types are present ought to possess appropriate types of ammunition for specified applications. Along with ammunition selection, the way ammunition is loaded and fed is an equally important variable of shotgun operation. There are two types of magazines that shotgun ammunition is stored in: tubular magazines and box magazines<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ivan argues that box magazines are inadequate to address drone operations, explaining that over time, rounds inside the magazine collapse. This is due to the constant spring pressure of the magazine, which results in warping of the original circular-shaped rounds being squeezed into an oval. Oleksandra elaborates on this point in a follow-up interview, explaining that this deformation can result in malfunctions like feeding jams and improper chambering.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"Diagram\n
Diagram comparing a semi-automatic shotgun with a tubular magazine against a pump action and bullpup shotgun with a box magazine design. Translated by Oleksandra Iliukhina. Source: GunBro Ukraine<\/em><\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n

Tubular magazines avoid this problem entirely. Oleksandra explains that since shells sit linearly in tubular magazines, the magazine spring applies pressure to the brass portion of the shell (the base) rather than the plastic portion (the hull).<\/p>\n

This mechanism ensures that the round maintains its original shape, regardless of how long the round has been loaded. Rationally, Ivan and Oleksandra endorse tubular magazines rather than box magazines for frontline anti-drone operations.<\/p>\n

Training Aspects<\/h2>\n

The shotgun functions as half of the overall approach to effective drone countermeasures, while the other half has to do with the soldier behind the shotgun itself. In a second interview<\/a> conducted by Volya Radio on November 8, 2025, Ivan provides insight as to what training entails. This article acknowledges that this is only one program of shotgun instruction that is being taught in Ukraine and should not be taken as a representative universal method for all programs across Ukrainian forces.<\/p>\n

Training begins with a proper platform selection. Ivan is clear on this point. In the interview, Ivan states that a semi-automatic shotgun is the most effective against drones, as well as more accessible. For a pump action to be effective, the operator needs to be extensively trained in shooting and possess flawless technique, a capability that can only be obtained through immense amounts of training.<\/p>\n

Ivan has constructed a training system that transitions civilians, Ukrainian soldiers, and Ukrainian special unit groups through sequenced stages of drone engagement, with each stage refining the physical and cognitive abilities needed for drone encounters. Ivan begins with the “First Base Program,” the stage in which users are trained on the fundamentals of quick reload skills and transitioning between targets. This stage has users executing three quick consecutive shots while standing still, transitioning between three targets.<\/p>\n

After that, users then transition to moving targets. Moving targets are installed on a platform-mounted system and, when activated, move horizontally. This helps train new operators in following targets, but also in the skill of waiting for the target, or preemption, gauging the distance of the target to determine where the projected location of the target will be next. Only after the shooters understand the first two stages of training do they begin to move on to flying clay pigeons.<\/p>\n

Ivan describes three aspects of training when it comes to exercises with flying clays. The easier beginning rounds start with the clays first being fired to the left side of a user, and then to the right side. The hardest phase is when the clay fires directly toward a user, mimicking an offensive drone.<\/p>\n

Each unique aspect of the clay training is meant to teach operators the skill of shotgun movement when in drone engagements, distinct from movement when conducting engagements in trench-related environments. Ivan explains that since shotgun magazine capacities are lower than a rifle’s magazine capacity, soldiers need to be consistently reloading while also moving.<\/p>\n

If a soldier stands still while reloading, it increases the likelihood of being struck by a drone. Soldiers need to move laterally while reloading to give themselves additional opportunities to hit the drone if the initial shots are unsuccessful. In addition to using flying clays to replicate drone movement, Ivan also uses real drones in his training routine.<\/p>\n

Ivan explains that to mimic a live situation, he uses bottles and attaches them to various drones. Users are then instructed to hit the bottle attached below the drone as part of the exercise.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"Ivan\n
Ivan Iliukhin tracking a live drone during a training exercise. Source: GunBro Ukraine<\/em><\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n

Ukrainian soldier Lux, who was mentioned earlier, endorses a variation of Ivan’s live-drone approach. Instead of bottles, Lux prefers attaching balloons to the drone using a long sling. “I would highly recommend the training with balloons attached with a long sling to an FPV,” he says. “It’s very cost-effective\u2026The FPV won’t be damaged, and the balloon will have the same trajectory as a real FPV.”<\/p>\n

It is worth noting that these methods are not competing claims, and neither is offered to discredit the other. Each training method simply represents different training perspectives, and Lux’s preference does not detract from the value of Ivan’s program.<\/p>\n

That being said, another point where Lux departs from Ivan’s program deals with the clay pigeon curriculum. While Lux agrees that clay pigeons are capable of forging the necessary skills to defend against FPV drones, he considers them predictable at a certain point.<\/p>\n

“I shot with a semi-automatic shotgun at clay targets, but I definitely prefer training with balloons attached by a sling to a drone,” he explains. “Clay targets fly most of the time in a specific direction over and over again. You already kind of know where to aim the second time.”<\/p>\n

However, Ivan and Lux’s approaches are not mutually exclusive as framed. In fact, the strength of Ivan’s program is the fact that each training method builds off of the other, a system of necessary sequential stages. Clay pigeons are not an endpoint but a foundational exercise that allows operators to build the necessary fundamentals before graduating to live drone scenarios.<\/p>\n

When positioned side by side, the two perspectives are less of a contest and closer to an intersection. Drone-like targets serve as the most realistic substitute for live encounters. Lux arrives at this conclusion through a slung balloon, Ivan through bottles. Each method differs in specifics but ends up supporting the same argument.<\/p>\n

Despite such an already thorough and disciplined training program, Ivan wants to continue to develop his program by adding a shooting range and obtaining more equipment for drone fighting scenarios. He explains that with this, he would be able to replicate realistic combat scenarios while imitating authentic drone encounters.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"Field\n
Field training materials developed for drone defense instruction, referencing engagement distances and ammunition descriptions. Source: GunBro Ukraine<\/em><\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n

Ivan hopes that programs such as his that specialize in shotgun instruction and training become a standard practice in every army, including NATO. Unfortunately, shotgun countermeasures against drones are still in a stage of infancy in Ukraine, leaving the field substantially underfunded and understudied.<\/p>\n

Future Combat Doctrine<\/h2>\n

FPV drones have expanded access to aerial combat capability, with impacts being seen to their fullest extent in Ukraine’s battlefield. Ukraine and its implementation of shotguns as a tool for drone defense represent a tactical adaptation to a large-scale, high-tech threat. It is not only the Ukrainian government that should invest in shotgun programs, as Ivan suggests, but every military force in the world.<\/p>\n

The economic adaptability and extent of Ukraine’s approach hold significant strategic weight. As Ivan notes, the shotgun doctrine that Ukraine has developed is effective and also elastic. Six months ago, one trained shotgun operator for each four-person team was sufficient.<\/p>\n

As of today, in the current combat landscape, every Ukrainian soldier operating within drone kill zones requires a shotgun, along with the necessary training to use it effectively.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"Ukrainian\n
Ukrainian soldiers conducting shotgun exercises next to a wrecked armored vehicle. Training facilitated by instructor Ivan Iliukhin. Source: GunBro Ukraine<\/em><\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n

<\/p>\n

\"Ukrainian\n
Ukrainian soldiers engaging in a group training session. Shooting stance refined by instructor Ivan Iliukhin. Source: GunBro Ukraine<\/em><\/figcaption>\n<\/figure>\n

The future doctrine of combat is relatively straightforward: anti-drone capability cannot be addressed as a specialized role. Defense capability against drones must be universal<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
\"A<\/figure>\n
\"A<\/figure>\n<\/div>\nA Russian tactical guide circulated amongst soldiers outlining situational responses to FPV drone encounters, containing engagement procedures, movement strategies, and injury guidelines. The development of a drone defense doctrine highlights the idea that FPV drone threats are not mutually exclusive to Ukraine; instead, it is a prominent feature of status-quo infantry combat. Source: @GrandpaRoy2 via X<\/em>\n

This article argues that the shotgun is a cost-effective, rapidly trainable, and capable tool, making it a feasible outlet to deliver drone defense capability on a large individual scale. Militaries, scholars, and leaders should treat Ukraine’s shotgun doctrine not as a one-off event only applicable to Ukraine, but as a predictive metric of future infantry operations.<\/p>\n

Ukrainian investment programs for shotguns are now underway, though, as Ivan explains, poor investment decisions are being made as a result of neglecting input from field experts. The consequence is that Ukrainian soldiers are now being supplied with Turkish semi-automatic shotguns that are unreliable and low quality, the exact scenario that Lux warned of.<\/p>\n

This dilemma indicates that investment and training problems are intertwined: a government can promote shotguns on the front lines, but without training systems and proper integration among soldiers, the shotgun remains functionally incomplete. Investment and training must progress symmetrically for both to advance at full capacity.<\/p>\n

Evidence strongly suggests that the future of combat will be decided by militaries that choose to adapt and integrate lessons from rapidly evolving battlefields, a scenario currently being illustrated in Ukraine. The implications of the shotgun doctrine in Ukraine suggest that battlefields are undeniably evolving, and that FPV drones are unlikely to be a Ukrainian anomaly.<\/p>\n

The same capability gaps that Ukraine identified and adapted to can be exploited by state and non-state actors alike. Thus, Ukraine’s shotgun doctrine should not be viewed simply as an answer to a current battlefield problem; rather, it should be viewed as an indicator of where infantry requirements are headed globally.<\/p>\n

Acknowledgements & Support<\/h2>\n

This article uses source material from interviews with Ivan Iliukhin and Oleksandra Iliukhina, who run shotgun instruction for civilians and Ukrainian forces through GunBro Ukraine. Oleksandra translated her father’s interviews and partners with him in training. Their firsthand experience made this analysis possible. Follow their work: Ivan Iliukhin (Instagram<\/a><\/span>), Oleksandra Iliukhina (Instagram<\/a><\/span>, Facebook<\/a><\/span>), GunBro Ukraine (\u7db2\u7ad9<\/a><\/span>, Facebook<\/a><\/span>)<\/p>\n

To contribute directly to their training program, donate here: https:\/\/givebutter.com\/shotgun<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

References<\/h2>\n<\/article>\n
    \n
  1. Unwave. “BMX250-5MS.”<\/a><\/span> Unwave.<\/li>\n
  2. Gross, W.H. “Chip”. “Shotgun Choke Explained Simply \u2014 No Math, We Promise.”<\/a><\/span> NRA Family, April 21, 2021.<\/li>\n
  3. Grossman, Dave, and Bruce K. Siddle. “Psychological Effects of Combat.”<\/a><\/span> The Moral Injury Institute, January 2010.<\/li>\n
  4. Axe, David. “The German-Made Gepard Gun Vehicle Is One of Ukraine’s Best Defenses Against Swarms of Russian Shahed Drones.”<\/a><\/span> Lucorg, July 20, 2025.<\/li>\n
  5. Hatsan. “Escort BTS-12.”<\/a><\/span> Hatsan.<\/li>\n
  6. TurDef. “Ukraine Uses Turkish Semi-Auto Shotguns.”<\/a><\/span> April 16, 2024.<\/li>\n
  7. Schwennesen, Paul. “Ukraine and DIY Drone Adaptability.”<\/a><\/span> GIS Reports Online, May 4, 2026.<\/li>\n
  8. Remington. “Buckshot Shotshell Product Page.”<\/a> Remington.<\/li>\n
  9. Federal Premium. “Speed-Shok Birdshot.”<\/a><\/span> Federal Premium.<\/li>\n
  10. Jeff and Will. “Ivan and Oleksandra Interview, Part 1.”<\/a> <\/span>Volya Radio, November 2, 2025.<\/li>\n
  11. Jeff, Robin, and WarDoggo. “Ivan and Oleksandra Interview, Part 2.”<\/a><\/span> Volya Radio, November 8, 2025.<\/li>\n
  12. Benelli USA. “M4 Tactical Series.”<\/a><\/span> Benelli USA.<\/li>\n
  13. Zabrodskyi, Mykhaylo, Jack Watling, Oleksandr V Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds. “Preliminary Lessons from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, February\u2013July 2022.”<\/a><\/span> RUSI, November 30, 2022.<\/li>\n
  14. Federal Premium. “Buckshot vs. Birdshot.”<\/a><\/span> Federal Premium, January 13, 2026.<\/li>\n
  15. Johnston, Jeff. “Shotgun Magazines: Box-Fed vs. Tube-Fed.”<\/a><\/span> Shooting Illustrated, January 29, 2018.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    \u95dc\u65bcDTU<\/strong><\/p>\n

    DTU has grown now to well over 400 engineers, developers, experienced operators, project managers, and donors, to speed the development and spread of critical technological tools to Ukraine’s defenders. If you’d like to help in some way, whether by volunteering your skills or by donating financially, we’d love to hear from you on our site: https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

    Author Bio<\/strong><\/p>\n

    Vance Fulton is an undergraduate student studying Philosophy, Government, and Computer Science. His work sits at the intersection of defense research and Ukrainian policy, collaborating directly with Ukrainian advocates, soldiers, and combat instructors. He also serves as an outreach fellow for an Arizona-based nonprofit supporting Ukraine, where he conducts direct outreach across all 9 Arizona Congressional districts on U.S.-Ukraine relations, NATO commitments, and transatlantic security.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Ukraine\u2019s Approach to Drone Defense The philosophy of Ukraine\u2019s shotgun deployment as a counter method against FPV drones. An analysis of what works, what does not, and future tactical considerations. June 2, 2026By Vance Fulton \u00a0 Evolving Threat Environment Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered an unparalleled shift in combat trends and operations […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":6304,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6279","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-product-development"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/tw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6279","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/tw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/tw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/tw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/tw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6279"}],"version-history":[{"count":75,"href":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/tw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6279\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6374,"href":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/tw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6279\/revisions\/6374"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/tw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6304"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/tw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6279"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/tw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6279"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/defensetechforukraine.org\/tw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6279"}],"curies":[{"name":"\u53ef\u6fd5\u6027\u7c89\u5291","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}